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What we refer to as the global financial crisis is, at its core, a crisis of 
credit markets, centered particularly in the United States, the UK and Europe, but 
with significant spill-over effects to the rest of the world.
Over the last year or so, financial institutions in the major economies have 
reported losses on a large scale. Some of these institutions have become insolvent, 
or have had to be taken over or rescued by their governments. Associated with all 
of that has been a massive swing in the appetite of world financial markets for risk, 
and in their capacity to accept risk. The result has been a shift from easily available 
credit to tight credit.
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Abstract
The financial crisis of 2007–2009 has been called the worst financial crisis since the 
one related to the Great Depression by leading economists, and it contributed to the 
failure of key businesses, declines in consumer wealth estimated in the trillions of 
U.S. dollars, substantial financial commitments incurred by governments, and a 
significant decline in economic activity. Many causes have been proposed, with 
varying weight assigned by experts. Both market-based and regulatory solutions have 
been implemented or are under consideration, while significant risks remain for the 
world economy.This type of financial cycle, while very severe in the current case, is not 
new. The roots of the current global financial crisis can be traced back to the fallout 
in the US supreme mortgage lending, which started in early 2007. It spread to other 
markets and economies via a combination of market failures and regulatory 
weaknesses.
In general, markets failed because of poor corporate governance and 
incompatible executive remuneration structures. The lack of transparency in 
trading procedures, financial instruments, and balance sheet positions of major 
financial institutions also exacerbated market failures.
Most countries have weak idiosyncratic rules pertaining to the operation of 
trading instruments and financial conglomerates. Poor capital regulation and 
accounting rules contributed to excessive risk-taking by banks. In addition, some 
rating agencies were also not subjected to the jurisdiction of the national regulators.
The international financial sector temporarily went into rigor mortis 
following mutual distrust between financial market participants in September 2008. 
This in turn led to a complete breakdown of short-term financial transactions in 
leading advanced and emerging market economies, and subsequently, a meltdown 
in global securities exchanges.
With the freezing of inter-bank lending and money markets, capital could 
not be channeled to economic agents operating across the entire production chain. 
To resolve this problem, monetary authorities and governments took numerous 
policy actions to prevent the crisis from spreading further. The main priority was to 
restore confidence in the global financial system.
This was followed by the need to recapitalize financial intermediaries 
either   through   direct   capital   injections   or   merger   and   acquisition   plans. 
Furthermore, active global coordination schedules were also implemented to 
minimize cross-border contagion effects.
The general consensus is that the current blockage in short-term financial 
market operations will be resolved in a relatively short time. Of course, certain 
researchers may expect a much longer time to defrost the global financial markets 
as well as to revive short-term lending.
In this case, the real sector may have to suffer a prolonged recession. In 
contrast,   the   process   of   deleveraging   and   recapitalization   of   financial 
intermediaries, and the restoration of market confidence will entail a much longer 
period. Consequently,  global financial markets will remain restrictive in the 
medium term, and possibly leading to poor allocation of credit as well as higher 
cost of funds.
On the other hand, both macroeconomic and microeconomic policies may 
also play their roles in negating the adverse effects of the financial crisis. As 
economies slow along with falling price levels, central banks may lower their 
official policy rates.
At the same time, monetary authorities may also opt to loosen their 
administrative procedures, such as the reserve requirement ratios, ceiling or floor 
caps, among others. Fiscal stimulus – for example, infrastructure spending, tax 
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an otherwise hard landing in the economic activity of each country.
The large-scale financial system deleveraging since October last year has 
brought about massive capital outflows from emerging market economies. Volatile 
capital flows has also led to wild exchange-rate fluctuations across the world.
What are the relative success and costs of these macroeconomic policies?
First, monetary easing may only be effective provided that inflation and 
inflation expectations are anticipated to fall in the medium term. The strengths and 
characteristics of the financial sector as well as the transmission process are other 
important factors determining the success of monetary policy.
2. Periodic monitoring
Although the efficacy of other administrative tools may be small, their use 
in addition to policy rate changes may be useful. Large and persistent cuts in 
official interest rates may tend to accelerate inflation in the long run.
Consequently,   there   is   a  trade-off   between   successfully  resuscitating 
economic performance in the short to medium term from monetary laxity, and 
episodes of rapidly rising inflation in the long run. Hence, periodic monitoring of 
both economic and financial indicators may be a necessary task of the monetary 
regulator.
Similarly, large infrastructure spending may involve unknown budgetary 
costs to governments. It is routine for governments to fund such projects through 
fixed income securities. Accordingly, a large, liquid, and deep bond market may be 
necessary. Moreover, having a high rating of sovereign debt is important. The 
success of this tool also depends on the existence of a current account surplus to 
avoid the twin deficit problem.
It is well known that a reduction in taxes to boost consumption and 
investment will be compensated through much higher taxation in the future. 
Ongoing fiscal stimulus may generate large budget deficit in the long run with 
negative consequences in the event of a protracted recession. Thus, it is necessary 
to maintain an optimal size of fiscal package and fiscal sustainability measures to 
circumvent future debt crisis.
In   terms   of   microeconomic   policies,   individual   governments   may 
implement special credit management or evaluation policies for sectors badly 
affected by the global financial turmoil.
Finally, to prevent a similar financial crisis in the future, it is useful to 
implement reforms on part of rules and regulation governing the operation of 
financial markets, market participants, and trading instruments.
Higher degree of disclosure and transparency by all financial institutions 
may be relevant, in addition to having better, harmonious, and unified law for 
financial conglomerates. Reforms should also mitigate asymmetric information 
between financial market participants and other economic agents. Having better 
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are also equally important.
How is the world economy being affected by the crisis?
There’s no doubt that conditions in the major economies took a sharp turn 
for the worse in the period following the Lehman collapse in September last year. 
Business   and   consumer   confidence   deteriorated   markedly,   as   did   financial 
sentiment.  
In   the   general  climate  of   uncertainty,   households  around  the  world 
responded by cutting their discretionary spending. This seems to have had a 
particularly pronounced effect on demand for manufactured goods. The result was 
a   sharp   fall   in   global   industrial   production   late   last   year,   and   significant 
contractions in GDP in most of the major economies. The Chinese and Indian 
economies continued to expand, but at much reduced rates. Indications are that 
world economic conditions have remained very weak in the early part of 2009.
3.1 Effects on the global economy
A number of commentators have suggested that if the liquidity crisis 
continues,   there   could   be   an   extended  recession  or   worse.   The   continuing 
development of the crisis prompted fears of a global  economic collapse. The 
financial crisis is likely to yield the biggest banking shakeout since the savings-
and-loan meltdown. Investment bank UBS stated on October 6 that 2008 would see 
a clear global recession, with recovery unlikely for at least two years. 
Three days later UBS economists announced that the "beginning of the 
end" of the crisis had begun, with the world starting to make the necessary actions 
to fix the crisis: capital injection by governments; injection made  systemically; 
interest rate cuts to help borrowers. The United Kingdom had started systemic 
injection, and the world's central banks were now cutting interest rates. UBS 
emphasized the United States needed to implement systemic injection. UBS further 
emphasized that this fixes only the financial crisis, but that in economic terms "the 
worst is still to come". 
UBS quantified their expected recession durations on October 16: the Euro 
zone’s would last two quarters, the United States' would last three quarters, and the 
United Kingdom's would last four quarters. The  economic crisis  in  Iceland 
involved all three of the country's major banks. Relative to the size of its economy, 
Iceland’s banking collapse is the largest suffered by any country in economic 
history. 
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   Countries in official recession (two consecutive quarters)
   Countries in unofficial recession (one quarter)
   Countries with economic slowdown of more than 1.0%
   Countries with economic slowdown of more than 0.5%
   Countries with economic slowdown of more than 0.1%
   Countries with economic acceleration
    N/A
Figure 1. Effects of economic crisis
(Between 2007 and 2008, as estimates of December 2008 by the International Monetary Fund)
At   the   end   of   October   UBS   revised   its   outlook   downwards:   the 
forthcoming recession would be the worst since the Reagan recession of 1981 and 
1982 with negative 2009 growth for the U.S., Euro zone, UK and Canada; very 
limited recovery in 2010; but not as bad as the Great Depression. 
The Brookings Institution reported in June 2009 that U.S. consumption 
accounted for more than a third of the growth in global consumption between 2000 
and 2007. "The US economy has been spending too much and borrowing too much 
for years and the rest of the world depended on the U.S. consumer as a source of 
global demand." With a recession in the U.S. and the increased savings rate of U.S. 
consumers, declines in growth elsewhere have been dramatic. For the first quarter 
of 2009, the annualized rate of decline in GDP was 14.4% in Germany, 15.2% in 
Japan, 7.4% in the UK, 9.8% in the Euro area and 21.5% for Mexico. 
By March 2009, the Arab world had lost $3 trillion due to the crisis. In 
April 2009, unemployment in the Arab world is said to be a 'time bomb'. In May 
2009, the United Nations reported a drop in foreign investment in Middle-Eastern 
economies due to a slower rise in demand for oil. In June 2009, the World Bank 
predicted a tough year for Arab states. In September 2009, Arab banks reported 
lost nearly to $4 billion since the global financial crisis onset. 
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Real gross domestic product — the output of goods and services produced 
by labor and property located in the United States — decreased at an annual rate of 
approximately 6 percent in the fourth quarter of 2008 and first quarter of 2009, 
versus activity in the year-ago periods. The U.S. unemployment rate increased to 
9.5% by June 2009, the highest rate since 1983 and roughly twice the pre-crisis 
rate. The average hours per work week declined to 33, the lowest level since the 
government began collecting the data in 1964.
A useful way of summarizing these developments is to look at the 
evolution of official forecasts by bodies such as the IMF. As recently as July last 
year, the IMF forecast for world growth in 2009 was 3.9 per cent, or closes to 
average. Revised forecasts released in January were cut back to growth of ½ per 
cent, and it now looks likely that the next revision will show a contraction in world 
GDP this year.
A shift in the forecast of this magnitude within such a short period of time 
is, to my knowledge, unprecedented. I don’t say that as a criticism of the 
forecasters, but as an indication of how quickly the situation has been changing, 
especially over the last six months. On the latest forecasts, growth of the world 
economy is expected to resume in 2010, as the various policy measures that are 
being put in place gradually take hold.
How are authorities around the world responding to the crisis?
It’s important to recognize that substantial actions are being taken on a 
number of fronts to restore growth and to improve the functioning of financial 
systems.
On monetary policy, central banks around the world have cut their policy 
interest rates to very low levels. They’ve supplemented that with a range of actions 
to provide additional liquidity to financial markets.  
In addition to that, governments in the major economies have provided 
direct support to their financial institutions. They’ve done that through a variety of 
mechanisms including direct capital injections, asset purchases and the provision of 
various forms of guarantees. More still needs to be done, but one encouraging sign 
is that banks have been able to make good use of their capacity to issue guaranteed 
bonds, and this is helping to alleviate uncertainty about the availability of longer-
term funding.
Another area of substantial response has been in fiscal policy. Many of the 
large countries including the US, the UK, Germany and China have announced 
major packages to support demand in 2009 and in 2010. In total, discretionary 
fiscal measures announced since late last year will provide a stimulus of close to 2 
per cent of world GDP in 2009. This is in addition to the effects of the automatic 
fiscal stabilizers, which are them selves quite substantial.
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financial regulatory policies. Without going into details, the overarching issue here 
is the need to better contain financial risk taking, and to do so in a way that remains 
effective as the financial system evolves. As I said earlier, experience suggests that 
regulations aimed at containing risk-taking can result in risk being pushed out to 
the unregulated part of the system. It’s in the nature of markets that they will tend 
to innovate around regulations, and in any case the nature of risk-taking is going to 
keep changing as financial systems get more sophisticated. All of that highlights 
the need for regulatory frameworks to be adaptable to changing circumstances.
Because of the interdependency among financial systems, these issues 
necessarily have to be tackled co-operatively at an international level. Considerable 
work is being done on this front by the major international bodies, including the 
Financial Stability Forum and the G-20, and Australia is playing an active part in 
that.
Official economic projections
On November 3, 2008, the EU-commission at Brussels predicted for 2009 
an extremely weak growth of GDP, by 0.1 percent, for the countries of the Euro 
zone (France, Germany, Italy, etc.) and even negative number for the UK (-1.0 
percent),  Ireland  and  Spain. On November 6, the IMF at  Washington, D.C., 
launched numbers predicting a worldwide recession by -0.3 percent for 2009, 
averaged over the developed economies. On the same day, the Bank of England 
and the Central Bank for the Euro zone, respectively, reduced their interest rates 
from 4.5 percent down to three percent, and from 3.75 percent down to 3.25 
percent. Economically, mainly the car industry seems to be involved. As a 
consequence, starting from November 2008, several countries launched large "help 
packages" for their economies.
The U.S. Federal Reserve Open Market Committee release in June 2009 
stated: "...the pace of economic contraction is slowing. Conditions in financial 
markets have generally improved in recent months. Household spending has shown 
further signs of stabilizing but remains constrained by ongoing job losses, lower 
housing wealth, and tight credit. Businesses are cutting back on fixed investment 
and staffing but appear to be making progress in bringing inventory stocks into 
better alignment with sales. Although economic activity is likely to remain weak 
for a time, the Committee continues to anticipate that policy actions to stabilize 
financial markets and institutions, fiscal and monetary stimulus, and market forces 
will contribute to a gradual resumption of sustainable economic growth in a 
context of price stability." Economic projections from the Federal Reserve and 
Reserve Bank Presidents include a return to typical growth levels (GDP) of 2-3% 
in 2010; an unemployment plateau in 2009 and 2010 around 10% with moderation 
in 2011; and inflation that remains at typical levels around 1-2%.
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To conclude, financial cycles like the one we’re having now are not new, 
but this one has been very severe, and it entered a particularly intense phase with 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September last year. These events have driven 
a sharp downturn in global demand and activity. In this environment, it’s not going 
to be possible for Australia to avoid some further weakness in 2009.
Nonetheless, it’s important to recognize that some very substantial actions 
are being taken around the world to alleviate financial strains, and to restore 
growth over time. Australia is fortunate to have come into this period in better 
shape than most, with sound financial institutions, and with more scope than most 
for macroeconomic policies to respond as needed.
Once again, I want to thank the Foundation for the invitation to speak 
today, and I wish them success in their very important work.
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